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I. Whether student speech outside the school setting is governed by Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and its progeny? 
 
II. If so, whether application of Tinker standard and its progeny allow Petitioner's speech to 
be regulated by Respondent, the Murano School District? 
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United States Constitutional Provisions 
 








The opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Lovely State 
is unreported but may be found on pages 15-17 of the appellate record. (R. at 15-17).  The 
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the 50th Circuit Court is likewise unreported 
but may be found at page 20 of the appellate record (R. at 20).  
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals entered judgment on September 30, 2010. (R. at 20). Petitioner filed 
his petition for writ of certiorari on December 30, 2010. (R. at 21). This Court granted the 
petition on June 7, 2011. (R. at 22). This Court's jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court's fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 9, 2009, Michael Fernando (“Fernando”) created a virtual group page on 
an independent social networking site called “Facebook.” (R. at 15). The group was formed to 
protest recent hiring decisions of the Murano School District (“Murano”) where Fernando is 
currently a student. (R. at 2). In addition, Fernando hoped that the page would serve to inform 
the community while providing a forum where other students would be able to assemble in order 
to voice their related opinions. (R. at 2 & 6).  
Fernando never advertised, displayed or accessed the page on school grounds or during 
school hours. (R. at 6). Nevertheless, the group continually gained popularity as students became 
increasingly invested in the site’s content. (R. at 6). Group subscribers, acting independent of 
Fernando, began directing the page’s content by posting their own expressions in various forms. 
(R. at 6).  
The group came to the attention of school administrators when, without his knowledge or 
consent, Fernando’s drawings surfaced on campus. (R. at 15). Although he drew and posted 
content for the page, it was not his intention for said content to be brought or otherwise seen on 
school grounds. (R. at 6).  
On September 14, 2009, in violation of the First Amendment, administrators demanded 
that Fernando delete the group. (R. at 7). In recognition of his constitutional rights, Fernando 
refused. (R. at 7). His refusal resulted in his indefinite suspension from Murano I High School. 
(R. at 12). Because of this punishment, Fernando, an Advanced Placement student who 
maintained a 4.0 grade point average and also served as the varsity basketball captain, will be 




In order to ameliorate potentially irrevocable damages to Fernando, Fernando’s attorney 
filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin Murano from continuing his suspension from 
school. (R. at 6). The District Court for the Southern District of Lovelystate denied the motion. 
(R. at 15-17). Unwilling to recognize a distinction between on and off-campus speech, the Court 
hypothesized that the site’s effects would be found to outweigh Fernando’s harms and he is, 
therefore, unlikely to succeed based on the merits of the case. (R. at 17). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fiftieth Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court’s decision without 
further analysis. (R. at 19).  
On June 7, 2011, Fernando’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court was granted. (R. 
at 22). Fernando respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Fiftieth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Insomuch as the First Amendment to the Constitution protects freedom of 
speech of American citizens, Michael Fernando and other students should be protected from 
unjustifiable punishments for off campus expressions. (R. at 10). 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Michael Fernando’s First Amendment rights were violated when the Murano United 
School District unreasonably demanded that he remove content from the internet that was not 
created at school. The four Supreme Court cases that have thus far addressed students’ First 
Amendment rights show that school jurisdiction over student expressions should be limited; to 
rule otherwise would infringe upon their constitutional rights. Although the Court has eroded the 
broad protections originally allowed by Tinker, they exclusively define school speech as speech 
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occurring in school-sponsored, school-supervised settings. Speech that occurs outside of these 
bounds is not subject to the restrictive precedent of school speech cases and is instead protected 
by the First Amendment.   
II. 
 Even if Tinker and its progeny are held to apply to off campus speech, the District Court 
erred in its application of the “substantial disruption” standard set by Tinker. Though the District 
Court did not apply any specific test to determine if a substantial disruption occurred, the effects 
of Fernando’s expressions did not meet either the sufficient nexus test or the foreseeability test 
that have been employed by other courts to determine the school’s right to jurisdiction. 
Additionally, because Fernando’s speech occurred online, in a voluntary public forum, it cannot 
reasonably be held to meet the standards set by Fraser and Hazelwood.  There is no evidence 
that the operation or safety of the school was put in jeopardy by Fernando, making the district’s 
attempted restriction and subsequent punishment unconstitutional.  
 
ARGUMENT 
I.  STUDENT SPEECH OCCURRING OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL SETTING 
SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIVE STANDARDS IMPOSED BY TINKER AND 
ITS PROGENY. 
 
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the government from creating any law 
that would abridge the people’s freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court 
empirically holds the First Amendment in high esteem, recognizing it as the fundamental source 
of American strength, independence and vigor. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). Additionally, this Court has recognized the importance of upholding 
the comprehensive authority of the States and school officials to control conduct in schools so 
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long as their exercise of control is “consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards.” See 
id. at 507.  
The juxtaposition of these competing values has resulted in contradictory theories 
concerning whether the First Amendment protects student speech. Some believe that “scrupulous 
protection” of our Constitutional freedoms is necessary in public schools, lest we “strangle the 
free mind at its source.”  See id. at 507. Conversely, it has been said that the First Amendment 
protections afforded to adults were not intended to apply to students within a public school. See 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986). 
In either case, expressions that take place outside of the bounds of school-regulated 
activities should be afforded the full protection of the First Amendment. (R. at 16) (citing 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). Those subscribing to the “scrupulous protection” 
standard of protection would not logically bestow fewer rights to expressions that take place 
outside of school. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. On the other end of the spectrum, those who 
believe that students should not be protected under the First Amendment while in school cannot 
exhaustively deny the constitutional rights of children by extending the authority of school 
administrators interminably. See id. at 511. The Supreme Court made it clear that students have 
fundamental rights that the State is required to respect and therefore concluded that schools do 
not have absolute authority to repress students’ speech. See id. While there may be some 
confusion at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply Tinker and other precedents, it 
is undeniable that an outer boundary exists, thereby limiting a school’s ability to exercise 
dominion over its’ students. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (citing Porter v. 
Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004)).  
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Because non-school speech is entitled to the more robust protections of the First 
Amendment, it is vital for courts to distinguish between on and off campus student speech. 
Morse at 404-05. Supreme Court precedent gives us a definition of “school speech” that has 
evolved past Tinker’s original geography standard to include actions that occur in either a 
primary or secondary school setting. See, e.g., id.  
A.  Tinker safeguards the First Amendment rights of students by expressly and 
impliedly recognizing the limited nature of schools’ regulatory authority.  
 
Tinker, which remains the seminal Supreme Court case addressing school speech despite 
subsequent exceptions, established broad protections of students’ First Amendment rights. See 
Tinker. In Tinker, the Court overruled a school’s refusal to permit students to wear black 
armbands in protest of the conflagration in Vietnam. See id. at 508, 514. The Tinker court, wary 
to abate the express freedoms of the Constitution, cautiously concluded that the First 
Amendment permitted reasonable regulation of speech in “carefully restricted circumstances.” 
See id. at 513. Because of the school’s educational and inculcative role, this Court held that a 
school may regulate students’ on-campus speech if it “materially and substantially” disrupts 
school activities, if the school can reasonably forecast that it will do so, or if the speech 
encroaches on the rights of another. See id. at 514. The Court further emphasized that mere “fear 
or apprehension of disturbance” is not enough to supersede the right to freedom of expression. 
See id. at 508. Unless there is a constitutionally valid reason for administrators to regulate an 
expression, students are entitled to express themselves freely. See id. at 511.  
The Tinker court began its analysis by recognizing the Constitutional rights of children 
when they famously stated that students do not forgo their rights upon entering the schoolhouse 
gate. See id at 506. Here, the Court implicitly declared that the constitutional rights of children 
not only pre-exist their status as students but also supersedes it. See id.  Although it would render 
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this imagery illogical, some confusion remains as to what extent Tinker was meant to apply to 
speech created beyond the actual or proverbial “schoolhouse gate.” See, e.g., id. at 401. 
This confusion most likely stems from the passage in Tinker that expresses that any 
behavior by a student, “in class or out of it”, which for any reason materially disrupts classwork 
or invades the rights of others is not protected by freedom of speech, regardless of the “time, 
place or type of behavior.” See id. at 513. Read in context, this passage can only be meant to 
apply to locations, like the cafeteria, that are on school grounds but are outside of the traditional 
classroom. See id. at 512-13. Otherwise, the carefully chosen examples written by the court 
would be completely arbitrary. See id.  Moreover, the court emphasizes the school’s “special 
characteristics” as a justification for empowering administrators to regulate student speech. See 
id. at 506. Application of the Tinker standard beyond school-sponsored activities would violate 
the very justification upon which Tinker was based. See Tinker. If Tinker had been meant to 
apply to speech occurring off school grounds, subsequent exceptions would not have been 
necessary. 
B.  Although subsequent Supreme Court holdings may apply beyond the physical limits 
of the schoolhouse gate, they only do so under limited circumstances during school-
related activities.    
 
The broad protections sanctioned by Tinker were gradually eroded by the narrow 
exceptions created by the three subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
683; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
Taken as a whole, these cases largely circumvent the geographic limitations of Tinker’s 
“schoolhouse gate” metaphor and allow administrators to govern speech in other limited 
circumstances, therefore expanding the definition of what qualifies as “school speech.” See 
Fraser; Hazelwood; & Morse.  
 7 
In Fraser, a student was disciplined for including sexually inappropriate, lewd language 
during a school speech endorsing a candidate for student government. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
677-78. Although it distinguished Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test by not requiring that a 
substantial disruption actually occur, the Fraser decision applies in one extremely narrow 
circumstance—a school-sponsored assembly. See id. at 676, 681. The Court rationalizes their 
holding by stating that a classroom or assembly is not a place for sexually explicit expressions 
directed towards a captive audience of teenage students; it never references situations occurring 
off campus.  See id. at 685. The holding repeatedly references the protective obligations of the 
school and uses those obligations to justify their analysis. See id.   
Moreover, Justice Blackmun clarified that if Fraser had given a comparable speech 
“outside of the school environment”, he could not have been punished simply because 
government officials considered his language indecent or offensive. See id. at 688 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). This further proves that a line, whether geographical or otherwise, exists which 
separates speech protected by the First Amendment and speech that is subject to the restrictions 
of school speech cases. See id. As the Third Circuit warned, applying Fraser to off-campus 
speech would be a slippery slope, ultimately making punishable any potentially offensive student 
expressions about the school. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mtn. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
In Hazelwood, the Court reached beyond the traditionally geographic boundaries 
encompassing school jurisdiction when it held that schools are able to regulate school-sponsored 
publications so long as their supervision is consistent with legitimate educational concerns. See 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 272-73. In this case, the school principal deemed two student-
written articles inappropriate and subsequently pulled them from the school newspaper. See id. at 
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263. The Supreme Court supported the principal’s authority to do so and held that regulating 
school-sponsored speech that may be reasonably be seen as bearing the imprimatur of the school 
was not a violation of the First Amendment so long as the regulations are “related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.” See id. at 273. Though the Supreme Court further eroded Tinker by 
allowing reasonable editorial discretion to school administrators over school-sponsored 
activities, it did not expressly extend that right to any off-campus speech which has not been 
affirmatively promoted by the school or would otherwise reasonably be received as bearing the 
imprimatur of the school. See id. at 270-271.  
Morse v. Frederick is the most recent case concerning student speech. Morse involves a 
student displaying a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored event. See 
Morse at 397. The principal confiscated the banner and suspended the student after having asked 
him to take it down. See id. Because the event occurred during normal school hours, was 
sanctioned by the principal, and was supervised by faculty, the Morse court held that this is a 
school speech case. See id. at 400-401. The Court found that the banner can reasonably be seen 
as promoting drug use and, because of the school’s obligation to protect students from this type 
of content, should not be protected by the First Amendment when displayed at a school-
sponsored event. See id. at 403-409. Like its predecessor, this holding applies to speech outside 
of the physical boundaries of the school grounds but during an activity that inherently possesses 
the special characteristics first recognized in Tinker. See id.  
One link between each of the aforementioned cases is that the school punished speech 
that occurred either at school or at a school-sponsored event. Since there is no enumerated test to 
determine what qualifies as school speech, these cases give us the only guidelines as to what 
types of speech the Supreme Court considers governable by officials. The two most recent cases 
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somewhat blurred the geographical bright-line between on and off-campus speech. Still, we are 
left with a fairly simple test of whether a particular expression is governed by these two 
exceptions: does the expression employ a medium sponsored by the school or did it take place at 
a school-sponsored event? In essence, when out-of-school speech falls outside of the realm of 
those two exceptions, it cannot be punishable by school officials.  
 
II.  ALTERNATIVELY, SHOULD THE RULINGS OF TINKER AND ITS PROGENY 
BE FOUND TO APPLY TO SPEECH OCCURRING OUTSIDE OF THE 
SCHOOL SETTING, SCHOOL SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT MURANO’S REGULATION IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
 
Regardless of whether this Court orders that Tinker and its progeny governs out-of-school 
speech, the district’s punishment of Michael Fernando is unjustifiable according to school speech 
jurisprudence. Fernando’s website, protesting hiring practices at the school, is the exact kind of 
speech that is meant to be protected by the First Amendment. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for 
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (“communication of information, the dissemination and 
propagation of ideas, and the advocacy of causes... are within the protection of the First 
Amendment”). Changes in technology should not obscure our constitutional lines and should 
therefore not change the view of what student speech is and is not. (R. at 17) (citing Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010)). In his recent concurrence in J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, Judge Smith stated that the decision as to whether 
speech is on-campus or off clearly cannot be based on where the speaker sits. See Snyder, 650 
F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). The point is well taken because of the omnipresent reach of 
Internet speech. However, a student's expressive act on Facebook can be analyzed using existing 
school speech jurisprudence.  
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A.  Fernando’s website cannot be determined to cause a “substantial disruption” 
because it does not meet the standards of the sufficient nexus test or the 
foreseeability approach. 
 
Unlike the Supreme Court’s school speech cases, the instant case concerns an expression 
which occurred off-campus in a forum that was not sponsored by the school. See Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 683; Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273; Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. Because the 
Supreme Court has not directly ruled on cases concerning online student speech, each 
jurisdiction has developed their own interpretations of student speech precedents, causing starkly 
contrasting holdings in factually parallel cases. Compare Snyder, 650 F.3d & Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).  Where courts have been consistent, is in requiring that a 
link be drawn that validates the school’s punishment of speech, like Fernando’s, which takes 
place outside of school. See e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. (refusing to use school speech 
precedent because the connection between the speech and the school was considered de 
minimus).  
The Second Circuit, for example, considered whether the off-campus speech was aimed 
at the school, and would foreseeably come on campus. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 
341 (2d Cir. 2011); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007). Doninger's blog explicitly encouraged students and 
others to contact the school administration to protest the cancellation of a school activity, thus it 
was “aimed at” the school. See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 341. In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit 
expressly held that off-campus speech could be the basis of school discipline when a student's 
violent and threatening off-campus instant message about killing a teacher “posed a reasonably 
foreseeable risk” that it would materially and substantially disrupt the school. See Wisniewski, 
494 F.3d at 341.  
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Both of these cases differ from the instant case. Unlike Doninger and Wisniewski, 
Fernando’s speech was not intended as a threat nor was it intended to cause any immediate 
action that would affect the business operations of the school. (R. at 6). In Wisniewski, the 
expression in question was threatening in nature. See id. at 38-39. This language is not meant to 
be protected by the First Amendment. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (5th—2004) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). The Fourth Circuit 
provides a parallel example when they allowed a school to punish speech that inherently violated 
a specific student with defamatory content. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 
(4th Cir. 2011). These types of expression could have been proscribed by any government entity. 
See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045. These jurisdictions extended the arm of the school in a case 
where the speech was not protected to begin with. In no way can the expressions created by 
Fernando be deemed violent or threatening, and should therefore be entitled to the full 
protections of the First Amendment. (R. at 6). 
Alternatively, lower courts have applied the sufficient nexus approach, which works 
concurrently with Tinker’s substantial disruption test. Here, the initial step is to determine 
whether there is a sufficient nexus between the expression and disruption on campus. See 
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d. If a nexus does not exist, there is no justification for punishment and 
the inquiry ends. If there is a sufficient nexus, the substantial disruption test is triggered. 
The Layshock holding correctly applied the substantial disruption test to off-campus 
cyberspeech because it used the sufficient nexus test appropriately. See Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007). Instead of using the test to link the speech 
to the school, the court in Layshock used the test to determine whether the speech caused a 
substantial disruption at the school. See id. This is an important distinction because if there is no 
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substantial disruption or reasonable likelihood of disruption, the speech should be protected. See 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. The best way to determine if speech has caused a substantial disruption 
is to determine whether there is a sufficient nexus between the speech and any disruption caused 
at school. See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599.  
If the sufficient-nexus test is properly applied to Fernando’s speech, it cannot reasonably 
be concluded that a nexus exists. According to the record, research has found that it is common 
for students to access Facebook from school and there is no evidence linking Fernando’s group 
page to this trend. (R. at 2). Regardless, merely accessing a website at school would not create a 
nexus sufficient to justify the application of school speech standards to an expression created 
outside of school. See id. at 601. Furthermore, the drawing being brought to school does not in 
itself cause a substantial disruption. Cf. Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 
455 (W.D. Pa. 2001). Providing an example, the Fifth Circuit in Porter held that a school could 
not punish a student for a drawing brought on campus without his consent. See Porter, 393 F.3d 
at 615.  
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the effects, which the district judge refers to as 
“not insignificant disruptions”, can constitute a substantial disruption. (R. at 16). Students passed 
the drawings around during classes and continuously referenced the content thereby making it 
difficult for teachers to maintain discipline in their classrooms. (R. at 12).  Justice Black’s dissent 
in Tinker described conduct similar to what took place at Murano I. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 
(Black, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Tinker also references comments being made but 
distinguishes these from threats or acts of violence. See id. at 508.  There, though vague, are the 
most specific guidelines given by the Tinker court to determine what would constitute a 
substantial disruption. See id. The type of exchange illustrated by the instant case was 
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encouraged by Tinker as a free exchange of ideas and a necessary evil in schools. Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 512.  
B.  Absent a substantial disruption, Fraser does not permit jurisdiction over offensive 
online speech, regardless of where it is created or accessed. 
 
Fraser mentions three factors, outside of Tinker, that would be necessary for a school to 
assert jurisdiction over student speech: 1.) Presence of a captive audience; 2.) The speech must 
include lewd or indecent sexual content; and 3.) The school must have a need to disassociate 
itself from the speech. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. Yet the District Court of Lovelystate only 
addresses one of these standards when they classify Fernando’s speech as lewd. (R. at 16). Had 
the court applied the other two prongs of this test, they would conclude that Fraser cannot 
logically apply to online speech.  
The Internet has no captive audience. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the captive-
audience doctrine in constitutional law as a principle that when an observer cannot realistically 
escape the expression, the speech can be restricted. Black's Law Dictionary 240 (9th ed. 2009). 
The Internet cannot possibly be subject to this principle. The record does not indicate that the 
website was mandatory or in any other way forced upon its subscribers. Any individual or group 
that found the site offensive can simply avoid the website and its contents. Generally, content 
that is viewed online is subject to the will of the viewer. Tinker also recognized the captive 
audience doctrine as justification for holding that a state may proscribe conduct in certain school 
settings. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 
The Frasier Court analyzed at length the school’s interest in disassociating itself from the 
lewd and sexually explicit language in Fraser’s monologue. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. The 
source of their interest was that the school sponsored the assembly where the speech was 
presented and it was necessary to make a point that such language was “inconsistent with the 
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fundamental values” of public schools. See id. In Hazelwood, this “disassociation” argument is 
clarified to include the imprimatur of the school and a reasonable likelihood that the expression 
would be directly associated with the views of the school. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 
281. Furthermore, Hazelwood concludes that the expression must also be in the context of a 
curricular activity. See id. Facebook, the site on which Fernando created his group, is a global 
social networking site that is entirely unaffiliated with the Murano school district. (R. at 8). 
Courts have found independent websites to have an out-of-school nature even if they are directed 
towards particular students or schools. See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dis. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 
1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000). It would be completely unreasonable, based on information in 
the record, for a person to conclude that the Facebook group bears the imprimatur of the school 
district. 
Facebook, as a forum for Fernando’s protest group, cannot feasibly meet all three prongs 
of the Fraser test. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. Not only is Facebook a global internet site, 
inherently without a captive audience, but it also would not reasonably be affiliated with the 
school district to warrant their suppression of the site. The District Court of Lovelystate’s 
holding applied incomplete precedent to vague facts and, because of this, produced an erroneous 
holding that should be reversed by this Court. (R. at 16).  
C.  Limiting the reach of Tinker and its progeny to speech which occurs on school 
grounds does not inhibit the ability for schools to maintain a safe environment. 
 
By limiting Tinker and its progeny, schools do not lose their ability to protect students. 
Other tests exist to evaluate free speech, namely the “true threat” test. Expressions where the 
speaker intends to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence are considered “true threats.” See Porter, 393 F.3d 608 (5th—2004) (citing Virginia v. 
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)). True threats are not protected by the First Amendment. See id. 
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Therefore, any threatening speech can be addressed by administrators regardless of whether the 
true threat takes place outside of school or was not communicated directly to the school, thus 
allowing them to maintain a protective environment for their faculty and study body. See, e.g., 
Porter, 393 F.3d 608 (5th—2004). Similarly, the “fighting words” test can be applied to regulate 
off-campus speech that is aimed at the school, student body or faculty and would likely result 
invoke a physically violent response in a reasonable person. (R. at 8) (citing Klein v. Smith, 635 
F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (1986)). In addition, schools do maintain the option of punishing the 
perpetrators of any “substantial disruption” on schools grounds even when they cannot punish 
the incentivizing idea.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of the First Amendment 
and the indefinite detrimental consequences that result when citizens are denied this fundamental 
right. By reconciling the presented facts with existing school speech jurisprudence, it becomes 
clear that Fernando’s rights were violated by the school district. His Internet site should not 
qualify as school speech under Supreme Court doctrine because it does not occur on school 
grounds or during any school-supervised, school-sponsored activity. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that a substantial disruption took place nor is there evidence linking Fernando’s actions 
to any conduct disturbing the function of the school.  Absent a substantial disruption, the 
punishing student speech can only be justified if the school maintains a protective role of a 
captive audience or if the speech could reasonably be seen to bear the imprimatur of the school. 
Neither of these exceptions are met in the instant case, further proving that the district attempted 
to restrict Fernando’s speech for no reason other than to avoid their own discomfort, making 
their actions unconstitutional and reprehensible.   
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PRAYER 
For these reasons, Petitioner prays the Court overturn the decision of the court below and 
remand for further proceedings.  
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of March, 2012. 
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